Introduction
Assessing the consequences of population on the pace and process of economic growth is one of the oldest themes in the literature on economics. These assessments have varied enormously over time, spanning the highly pessimistic to the outright optimistic.
A systematic review of the major studies in this literature represents a useful way to organize a survey of the consequences of demographic change. Such an approach places the population debates in perspective, and it infuses a healthy dose of caution in appraising current debates. Specifically, how have the "bottom-line" appraisals of the consequences of demographic change on development changed over time; why have they changed;
and what are the most recent contributions to this literature?
The Beginnings: Malthus (1798)
The debate began with two propositions by the Reverend Thomas Malthus in 1798 (First Essay on Population) that population would grow at a geometric rate (e.g., 1, 2, 4, . . .) due mainly to a lack of conscious restraints on fertility, and that food would grow at an arithmetic rate (e.g., 1, 2, 3, . . .) due substantially to diminishing returns to increasingly scarce land.
The resulting outcome would be food shortages, starvation, and deaths. In the long run, population size would be held in check by food availability and mortality. Population pressures would 2 constrain income per capita to a low level of subsistence--a "Malthusian trap," as it has been termed. These images caused economics, unfairly, to be dubbed the "dismal science." Fortunately Malthus' predictions were not sustained by the preponderance of experience over the next two centuries. Couples did not breed without restraint, but rather by consciously managing fertility in response to changing conditions. Food was not unduly constrained by land availability. Instead, technology blossomed and food expanded apace in the very geographic regions where Malthus focused his empirical studies. Ironically, food surpluses turned out to be a "problem" confronting many nations, and governments implemented policies designed to curtail farm production.
Clearly the Malthusian ideas regarding population-economic linkages were incomplete, and richer analytical and empirical foundations were needed. The urgency for such a framework was made apparent by demographic events. By the mid 20th century, it was recognized that the simultaneous occurrence of declining mortality and exceptionally high and sustained fertility in scores of developing countries was resulting in high population growth rates. A concern emerged that these rates could not be sustained over long periods of time. While, as in the past, fertility would predictably decline (a la the Demographic Transition), still it was unclear whether such a decline would be soon or rapid enough to avoid potentially deleterious effects on welfare, economic progress, and the environment. Thus, while the "Malthusian Problem" reappeared, approaches to assessing population consequences assumed quite different tacks. It was time for a fresh reassessment.
Expanded Elaborations: 1950s, 1960s, 1970s
2.1 The United Nations (1953) The first major installment that exposed economic-demographic interactions in detail was provided in a seminal study by the United Nations in 1953, The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends. This study was both balanced and comprehensive. Twenty-one economic-demographic linkages were taken up. The impact of population on some factors was judged to be positive (economies due to scale and organization), on some negative (diminishing returns), and on some neutral (technology and social progress). Overall, a net negative impact of undetermined size was considered most likely in much of the developing world, although this conclusion was guarded, and the UN predicted a wide diversity of effects according to countryspecific conditions.
Coale and Hoover (1958)
A second major installment in the evolution of demographic assessments appeared in 1958 in an influential book by Ansley J. Their analysis rested on two premises. First, household and economy-wide saving would be diminished by large families; it certainly would not be stimulated enough in response to demographic changes to provide the increased capital required by an enlarged population. Second, economy-wide investments would be skewed away from relatively productive activities since funds would be shifted toward so-called unproductive populationsensitive social expenditures (e.g., health and education). This crowding out of productive investment was linked mainly to the youthful age composition of the high-fertility population, and not population's size, density, or growth, per se.
The C/H study had a profound impact on U.S. population policy.
It also attracted the attention of academic scholars given its focus on physical capital (as distinct from the Malthusian focus on land), then considered by many to be a (the?) key to economic development.
The C/H study was not without challenge. Over time its impact waned, in part due to the appearance of empirical studies that failed to unearth empirically strong and consistent impacts of population pressures on Third World saving. This is not surprising. At the household level, such saving impacts are fundamentally based on a "life-cycle" conceptualization of behavior. This requires a lengthy "forward looking" planning 5 horizon. It also requires an institutional structure (e.g., developed capital markets and/or government social security options) to implement lifetime plans. These conditions do not describe the day-to-day survival mode of most residents of the Third World. Indeed, spending on children represents a form of saving (e.g., parents may expect transfers from their children in old age); and moreover, children can be quite productive both in the household and on the farm.
A second challenge to the C/H framework was the appearance of empirical studies that downplayed the role of country-wide age structures as a determinant of spending on education. Even in the face of population pressures, school enrollments and attainments advanced at historically unprecedented rates in many developing countries. This surprisingly occurred without substantial realignments in social budgets. Nations found ways to economize on education resources, and tradeoffs within education budgets were more pervasive than was assumed in the simple C/H model. In short, the empirical underpinnings of the C/H framework were questioned by an increasing body of evidence.
Additionally, over time economic theory itself was in flux, highlighting both the productivity of human capital (considered economically unproductive in the C/H model), and the importance of technical change (also absent in C/H). While these limitations do not diminish the importance of C/H's pioneering work, they served to shift the population debates in the ensuing decades. .", p. vi.) In contrast, the major research papers supporting that study in Volume II, which were much less pessimistic, were based on a longer-run focus. More than any other factor, the outcomes of the population debates from the 1970s to the present day would turn on this difference in time perspective. Direct, shorter-run impacts of demographic change are almost always attenuated (and sometimes even offset) by "feedbacks" that occur only over longer periods of time.
United Nations (1973)
In 1973 the United Nations updated its early assessment. This revision arrived at a less eclectic, and a somewhat more pessimistic (but by no means alarmist) evaluation of the various impacts of population growth. This is particularly true of anticipated difficulties of feeding the expanding populations (reverting to traditional Malthusianism), and of pressures on capital formation (reverting to the concerns of Coale and Hoover). In both cases, short-run, direct impacts were highlighted. The report downplays some indirect, longer-run 8 feedbacks that will likely occur due to price responses, and induced innovation and institutional change.
The most important new contribution to the population debate deriving from the 1973 study was a finding by Simon Kuznets that, based on simple correlations, a net negative impact of population growth on per capita output was not obvious in the data. While his work was based on longer-run assessments, and while they were appropriately qualified, they were important to conditioning the bottom-line UN assessment. Given the strong priors of demographers and policy makers that the negative impacts of population growth on development were large, the inability to easily "confirm" this hypothesis through simple, albeit inconclusive, correlations more than any other factor kept the population debate alive during the ensuing decades. The stage was set for a new round of debate. Third, it reintroduced to the debates the roles of alternative demographic impacts, specifically those of density and size, to add to the popular focus on population growth and age structure. Price-induced substitutions in production and consumption of natural resources, and an expansion of supply through discovery and technical advance, are offered to explain this result. Most importantly, these "adjustments" or "feedbacks" were in part caused by population pressures, a reality that could be exposed only by extending the analysis over several decades. It is this longer-run perspective, and the feedbacks in markets and other institutions, that account for Simon's findings.
Similarly, Simon hypothesized and attempted to document that the pace of technical change, and its bias, were actually stimulated by population pressures, particularly in agriculture where Ester Boserup's (1965) (1) there are both important positive and negative impacts of population growth (thus, "on balance"); (2) the actual size of the net impact--and even whether it is strong or weak--cannot be determined given current evidence (thus "qualitative"); (3) only the direction of the impact from high current growth rates can be discerned (thus "slower," and not "slow"); and (4) the net impact varies from country to country--in most cases it will be negative, in some it will be positive, and in others it will have little impact one way or the other (thus, "most developing countries").
It is interesting to speculate on factors that account for the guarded and qualified assessment of the NRC group. Three factors can be singled out.
First, the Summary Report highlights individual and institutional responses to initial impacts of population change--conservation in response to scarcity, substitution of abundant for scarce factors of production, innovation and adoption of technologies to exploit profitable opportunities, and the like. Second, the study was compiled almost exclusively by economists, whose faith in the potential for market-induced responses to modify initial direct impacts of population change is greater than that possessed by other social and biological scientists.
Third, research which had been accumulating over the past ten to fifteen years downplayed many of the previous concerns voiced on the impacts of rapid population growth. For example, as noted by Simon and others, the concern that population growth results in the exhaustion of non-renewable natural resources is misplaced.
The relationship between population growth and global resource use is not as strong as had been assumed.
Similarly, the concern about a substantial reduction of saving due to rapid population growth is not confirmed by the data.
While some capital shallowing occurs, the impact of this on economic growth is not particularly strong. Finally, the concern that population growth will significantly shift resources from productive physical capital formation into alleged "lessproductive" areas was not sustained by the data. The financing of educational enrollments, which expanded significantly even in the face of population pressures, came from some combination of increases in public (sometimes deficit) spending, reduction in per pupil expenditures, and efficiency gains.
Interestingly, a new concern was elevated in importance by the 1986 Report in the area of renewable resource degradation.
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Unlike non-renewable resources, property rights are difficult to assign or maintain for renewable resources like fishing areas and rain forests. Overuse can result. The problem is not population growth per se, but rather institutional failure. Cutting population growth in half would not solve the problem; it would only postpone the deleterious outcome of resource degradation.
The solution requires policies to focus on the causes of failure (the need for more effective property rights, market responses, and government policies to correct externalities) rather than a focus on population pressures, which mainly exacerbate the environmental responses.
Other Studies in the 1980s
The bottom-line assessments of five other studies in the 1980s The ability to address these issues coincided with the emergence in the 1990s of empirical "convergence" models of economic growth. Pioneered by Robert Barro, these empirical paradigms distinguish between factors (economic, political, social, institutional, geographic) that determine each country's long-run level of per capita output, and the shorter-to-intermediate-run
transition of countries to this longer-run state. These models lent themselves to investigating the impacts of demography since they exposed both short-and long-run impacts.
Efforts to model demography using the new convergence models have varied notably. Barro (1997), for example, looked primarily on the longer-run impacts of demography, and found that reductions in the total fertility rate increased the potential for economic growth.
In yet an earlier study, Kelley and Schmidt (1995) , building on the Barro core variables, distinguished between several alternative demographic influences on the economy's potential output in the long-run, (e.g., the impacts of population size and density), and timing of demographic impacts (e.g., the timing of reductions in birth and death rates) which influence both the short and long run. These timing specifications highlighted the reality that birth-rate reductions have an immediate positive impact on growth by economizing on child-rearing expenses while, in fifteen or so years, the impacts will be reversed, since there will be fewer persons entering their productive work force years.
Death rate reductions, especially infant/child mortality, can have similar timing impacts. Kelley and Schmidt found that these timing/transitional features were empirically important, and the long-run impacts of both density and size added modestly to growth as well. Bloom and Williamson (1998) 
